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Brain and BRame 
STEPHEN J. MORSE* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The discovery of biological pathology that may be associated with criminal 
behavior lures many people to treat the offender as purely a mechanism and the 
offensive conduct as simply the movements of a biological organism. Because 
mechanisms and their movements are not appropriate objects of moral and legal 
blame, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that the offender should not be 
held legally responsible. I suggest in contrast that abnormal biological causes of 
behavior are not grounds per se to excuse. Causation is not an excuse and , even 
within a more sophisticated theory of excuse, pathology will usually play a 
limited role in supporting an individual excuse. 
Parts II and III of this essay describe the law's concept of the person and its 
relation to moral and legal responsibility and excusing conditions. Part IV then 
examines why causation in general, even pathological causation, is not itself an 
excusing condition. Next, Part V turns to the specific relation of brain or other 
nervous system pathology to moral and legal responsibility properly under-
stood. Finally, to illustrate the essay 's theses, Part VI considers in detail the case 
of "Spyder Cystkopf," a man with a previously blameless history and a 
confirmed cyst that impinged on his brain , who killed hi s wife during a heated 
argument with her. 1 
II. THE LAw's C oNCEPT OF THE P ERSON 
Intentional human conduct, that is, action , unlike other phenomena, can be 
explained by physical causes and by reasons fo r action. Although physical 
causes exolain the movements of galaxies and planets, molecules, infrahuman 
< ~ -
species, and a11 the other moving parts of the physical universe, including the 
neurophysiological events accompanying human action, only human action can 
also be exp lained by reasons. It makes no sense to ask a bull that gores a 
matador, "Why did you do that?," but this question makes sense and is vitally 
* Ferdi nand Wake man Hubbe ll Profes sor, University of Pennsylvania Law SchooL and Professor of 
Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, Unive rsity of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. 
Th is essay was presented at the Georgetown University Law Center Faculty Workshop and at a pane l 
on ·'Neuropsychiatry in the Courtroom .. at the 1995 annual meet ing o f the American Ne uropsychiatric 
Associati o n. I thank participants at both presentations, and espec iall y Gregg Bloche, Larry Gostin. 
Helen Mayberg. John Monahan , Norm an Relkin, and Richard Restak for helpful comments. In 
modified form, the essay will also appear in Se111inors in Clinical NeumpsychiMrr. 
l. The fact s of the Spyder Cysrkopf case are drawn fro m Daniel A. Martell , Ne11· York 1'. Spw/cr 
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important when it is addressed to a person who sticks a knife into the chest of 
another human being. It makes a great difference to us if the knife-wielder is a 
surgeon who is cutting with the patient's consent or a person who is enraged at 
the victim and intends to kill him. 
When one asks about human action, "Why did she do that?," two distinct 
types of answers may be given. The reason-giving explanation accounts for 
human behavior as a product of intentions that arise from the desires and beliefs 
of the agent. The second type of explanation treats human behavior as simply 
one bit of the phenomena of the universe, subject to the same natural, physical 
laws that explain all phenomena. Suppose, for example, we wish to explain why 
Molly became a lawyer. The reason-giving explanation might be that she wishes 
to emulate her admired mother, a prominent lawyer, and Molly believes that the 
best way to do so is also to become a lawyer. If we want to account for why 
Molly chose one law school rather than another, a perfectly satisfactory explana-
tion under the circumstances would be that Molly chose the best school that 
admitted her. 
The mechanistic type of explanation would approach these questions quite 
differently. For example, those who believe that mind can ultimately be reduced 
to the biophysical workings of the brain and nervous system-the eliminative 
materialists-also believe that Molly's "decision" is solely the law-governed 
product of biophys ical causes. Her desires, beliefs, intentions, and choices are 
therefore simply epiphenomenal, rather than genuine causes of her behavior. 
According to this mode of explanation, Molly's "choices" to go to law school 
and to become a lawyer (and all other human behavior) are causally indistinguish-
able from any other phenomena in the universe, including the movements of 
molecules and bacteria. 
As clinical and experimental sciences of behavior, psychiatry and psychology 
are uncomfortably wedged between the reason-giving and mechanistic accounts 
of human conduct. Sometimes they treat ac tions as purely physical phenomena, 
sometimes as texts to be interpreted, and sometimes as a combination of the 
two. Even neuropsychiatry and neuropsychology, the more physical branches of 
their parent disciplines, are similarl y wedged because they begin their investiga-
tions with action and not simply with abnormal movements. One can attempt to 
assimilate reason-giving to mechanist ic explanation by claiming that desires , 
beliefs, and intentions are genuine causes, and not simply rationalizati ons of 
behavior. Indeed, folk psychology, the dominant explanatory mode in the social 
sciences, proceeds on the assumption that reasons for action are genuinely 
causal. But the assimilationist position is phi losophically controversial, a contro-
versy that will not be so lved until the mind-body problem is "solved" 2-an 
event unlikely to occur in the foreseeable fut ure. 
Law, unlike mechanistic explanation or the confEcted stance of psyc hiatry 
2. S'ee AI.EX!\NDER ROSENI:IERG , PHILOSO PH Y OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 47-49 ( ! 988) (ex pl aining the: 








1996] BRAIN AND BLAME 529 
and psychology, views human action as almost entirely reason-governed . The 
law 's concept of a person is a practical reasoning, rule-following being, most of 
whose legally relevant movements must be understood in terms of beliefs, 
desires , and intentions. As a system of rules to guide and govern human 
interaction-legislatures and courts do not decide what rules infrahuman spe-
cies must follow-the law presupposes that people use legal rules as premises 
in the practical syllogisms that guide much human action. No "instinct" gov-
erns how fast a person drives on the open highway. But among the various 
explanatory variables, the posted speed limit and the belief in the probability of 
paying the consequences for exceeding it surely play a large role in the driver's 
choice of speed. For the law, then, a person is a practical reasoner, a being 
whose action may be guided by reasons. The legal view of the person is not that 
all people always reason and behave consistently rationally according to some 
preordained, normative notion of rationality. It is simply that people are crea-
tures who act for and consistently with their reasons for action and are generally 
capable of minimal rationality according to mostly conventional, socially con-
structed standards. 
On occasion, the law appears concerned with a mechanistic causal account of 
conduct. For example, claims of legal insanity are usually supported and 
explained by using mental disorder as a variable that at least in part caused the 
defendant's offense. Even in such cases, however, the search for a causal 
account is triggered by the untoward, crazy reasons that motivated the defen-
dant. Furthermore, the criteria for legal insanity primarily address the defen-
dant's reasoning, rather than mechanistic causes. For example, in addition to a 
finding of mental di sorder, acquittal by reason of insanity requires that the 
defendant did not know right from wrong or was unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of her act. Conduct motivated by crazy reasons is intentional 
human action. The law excuses a legally insane defendant, however, because 
her practical reasoning was nonculpably inational , not because her behavior 
was caused by abnormal psychological or biological variables. Indeed, it is a 
simple matter to devise irrati onali ty criteria for legal insanity that would excuse 
all people now found legally insane, but which make no mention whatsoever of 
mental disorder or other alleged mechanistic causes . 
III. REASONS , RESPONS IBIUTY, AN D EXCUSES 
The law's conception of responsibility fo llows logically from its conception 
of the person and the nature of law itself. O nce again, law is a sys tem of rules 
that guides and governs human interaction. It tell s citizens what they may and 
may not do , what they must or must not do, and what they are entitled to. If 
human beings were not creatures who could understand and follow the rules of 
their society, who could not be guided by reasons , the law and all other systems , 
such as morality, that r·cgulate conduct by reasons and rules would be powerless 
to affect human action. Rule-fo llowers must be creatures who are capable of 
properly using the rules as premises in practical reasonmg. It follows that a 
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legally responsible agent is a person who is so capable according to some 
contingent, normative notion of both rationality itself and how much capability 
is required. For example, legal responsibility might require the capacity to 
understand the reason for an applicable rule, as well as the rule's narrow 
behavior command. These are matters of moral, political, and, ultimately, legal 
judgment, about which reasonable people can and do differ. There is no 
uncontroversial definition of rationality or of what kind and how much is 
required for responsibility. But the debate is about human action-intentional 
behavior guided by reasons. 
Specific legal responsibility criteria exemplify the foregoing analysis. Con-
sider the criminal law and criminal responsibility. Most substantive criminal 
laws prohibit harmful conduct. Fair and effective criminal law requires that 
citizens must understand what conduct is prohibited, the nature of their own 
conduct, and the consequences for doing what the law prohibits. Homicide 
laws, for example, require that citizens understand that unjustifiably killing 
other human beings is prohibited, what counts as killing conduct, and that the 
state will inflict pain if the rule is viol ated and the perpetrator is caught and 
convicted . A person incapable of unders tanding the rule or the nature of her own 
conduct, including the context in which it is embedded, could not properly use 
the rule to guide her conduct. For example, a person who delusionally believed 
that she was about to be killed by another person and ki lls the other in the 
mistaken belief that she must do so to save her own life, does not rationally 
understand what she is doing. She of course knows that she is killing a human 
being and does so intention ally, but the rule against unjustifiable homicide wi ll 
be ineffective because she delusionally believes that her action is justifiable. 
The inability to foll ow a rule properly, to be rationally guided by it, is what 
distinguishes the delusional agent from people who are simply mistaken , but 
who could have fo llowed rhe rule by exerting more effort, attention, or the like. 
We believe that the delusional person' s failure to understand is not her fa ult 
because she lacked the abili ty to understand in thi s context. In contrast, the 
person capable of ra tional conduct is at fault if she fa ils to exercise her 
rationality. In sum, rationali ty is requi red for responsibili ty, and nonculpable 
inationality is an excusing condition. Blaming and punishing an irrational agent 
for violating a rule she was incapable of following is unfair and an ine±Tecti ve 
mechani sm of social control. 
Responsibility also requires that the agent act without compulsion or coer-
cion, even if the agent is full y rational , because it is also unfair to hold people 
accountable for behavior that is wrongly compelled. For example, suppose a 
gunslinger threatens to kill you un less you kill another innocent person. The 
bal ance of evils is not positive : it is one innocent life or another, so the killi ng 
would not be justified. But it might be excused because it is compelled. 
Compul sion in volves a wrongful hard choice that a rational, otherwise respon-
sible agent faces. If she yields to the threat, it will not be because she doesn't 
understand the legal rule or what she is doing. She knows it is wrong and acts 
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intentionally precisely to avoid the threatened harm. Still , society, acting through 
its legal rules governing such cases, might decide that some choices are too hard 
fairly to expect the agent to behave properly and that people will be excused for 
making the wrong choice. If the hard choice renders the person irrational and 
incapable of rationality, then there is no need to resort to notions of compulsion 
to excuse. 
In sum, an agent is responsible for a particul ar action if she was capable of 
rationality and acted without compulsion in this context. If she was incapable of 
rationality or compelled to perform the particular action, she will be excused. 
IV. CAUSATION Is NOT AN EXCUSING CONDITION 
The "fundamental psycholegal error" is the mistaken belief that if science or 
common sense identifies a cause for human action, including mental or physical 
disorders, then the conduct is necessarily excused. But causation is neither an 
excuse per se nor the equivalent of compulsion, which is an excusing condition. 
For example, suppose that I politely ask the brown-haired members of an 
audience of lawyers to whom I am speaking to raise their hands to assist me 
with a demonstration. As I know from experience, virtually all the brunet(te)s 
will raise their hands, and I will than k them politely. These hand-raisings are 
clearly caused by a variety of variables over which the brunet(te) attorneys have 
no control, includ ing genetic endowment (being brunet(te) is a genetically 
determined, but-for cause of the behavior) and , mos t proximately, my words. 
Equally clearly, this conduct is human action-intentional bodily movement-
and not simply the movements of bodily parts in space, as if, for example, a 
neurological di sorder produced a similar arm-rising. Moreover, the conduct is 
entire ly rational and uncompelled. The cooperating audience members reason-
ably desire that the particular lecture they are attending should be useful to 
them. They reasonably believe that cooperating with the invited lecturer at a 
professional meeting will help sati sfy that desire. Thus, they form the intention 
to raise their hands, and they do so. It is hard to imagine more completely 
rational conduct, according to any normative notion of rationality. The hand-
raisings were not compelled, because the audience was not threatened with any 
untoward consequences whatsoever for failure to cooperate. In fact, the lectur-
er 's request to participate was more like an offer, an opportunity to make 
oneself better off by improving the presentat ion's effectiveness, and offers 
provide easy choices and more freedo m, rather than hard choices and less 
freedom.3 
The cooperati ve audience members are clearly responsible for their hand-
rais ings and fu lly desen;e my "thank you ," even though their conduct was 
perfectly predictable and every bit as caused as a neuropathologically induced 
arm-rising. My '' thank you" was not intended simply as a positive reinforcer fo r 
3. See A L AN \VERTH EI MER, C OERCI ON 204- 11 ( 1987 ) (distinguishing threats from offers and discuss-
ing ditlere nt methods of setting baselines to make the di stinction). 
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the hand-raising behavior the audience members performed. Gratitude is the 
appropriate moral sentiment in response to the willingness of the audience to 
satisfy the normatively justifiable expectation that they should cooperate and the 
reasonable assumption that a group of lawyers is composed of rational and 
therefore responsible moral agents. "Thank you" is the appropriate and de-
served expression of that moral sentiment. 4 Although the hand-raising conduct 
is caused, there is no reason why it should be excused. 
All phenomena of the universe are presumably caused by the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that produce them. If causation were an excuse, no one 
would be responsible for any conduct, and society would not be concerned with 
moral and legal responsibility and excuse. Indeed, eliminative materialists, 
among others, often make such assertions, 5 but such a moral and legal world is 
not the one we have, nor I daresay, one that most of us would prefer to inhabit. 
Although neuropathologically induced arm-risings and cooperative, intentional 
hand-raisings are equally caused, they are distinguishable phenomena, and the 
difference is vital to our conception of ourselves as human beings. This is not 
the appropriate place to offer a defense of the importance of responsibility and 
excuse and praise and blame, but I will simply assume that such human ideas 
and practices enrich our lives and encourage human flouri shing. 6 In a moral and 
legal world that encompasses both responsible and excused action , all of which 
is caused, the di screte excusing conditions that should and do negate responsibil-
ity are surely caused by something. Nevertheless, it is the nature of the excusing 
condition that is doing the work, not that the excusing condition is caused. 
The determinist reductio-everyone or no one is responsible if the tru th of 
determinism or universal causation underwrites responsibility-is often at-
tacked in two ways. The first is "selective determinis m" or " selective causa-
tion "-the claims that only some behavior is caused or determined and that 
on ly thi s subset of behav ior should be excused. The metaphysics of selective 
-+. I am bon·owing here from J<:~ y W<:~liac e ·s excellent. compat ibilist <:~ccount of what it me<:~ns to hold 
someone responsible. According to Wall ace . holding people moral ly responsible cannot be reduced to a 
behavioral di sposi tion positi vely and negative ly to reinforce good and bad conduct. respecti ve ly. It is a 
susce ptibility to experi ence the appropri ate moral se nti ments if another age nt meets or breaches a 
justifiabl e moral obligation that one accepts and then w express these emot ions through the app ropriate 
positive or negati ve practices, such as praise and blame. See R . .!A Y WAL L.->.CE. RESP00iS IBILITY .->.r-< D TH E 
MORAL Si:NTIMENTS 51 -83 ( 1994). 
One can imagine a wo rld in which praise and blame were used solel y for their operant cond itioning 
su<.:cess. but I suspe<.: t th<1t they would then be quite unsuccess ful. and the world would be a quite 
<.:hecrl ess place in general. 
5. For ~1thoughtful acco unt of eliminati ve m;neriali sm's imp!icu.tions for criminal law and responsibil -
ity. see Andrew E. Lelling. Eliminative /V[Oi eriali.\111. Neuroscience und th e Criminal La11·. 141 U. P.-\ . L. 
R ~-:v . 1471 ( 1993). For a more wide- ranging. re ce nt exp loration of elimi nati ve materi ali sm. see P .. \UL M. 
CHURCHI.A:-.iD, T HE E~:G I:'i E OF REASON , THE SE.\T OF THE S: ouL: A PHI LOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO TH F 
BR.-\iN ( 1995 ). Churchland briefly explores the moral and legal imp I icati ons. See id. at 309-1.:1-. 
6. See W.-\LL/\C E. supra note 4 , at 69 (claiming that such prac tices demonstrate ··our commitment to 
ce rtain moral stanclarcls , as regu lat ive of soc ial life.·· and m~•k c c; ' ·perh aps irrepla<.:eable con tributi on 
.. to the constitution and maintenance of moral communit ies·· ). 
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causation are wildly implausible and "panicky," 7 however. If this is a causal 
universe, as it most assuredly is, then it strains the imagination also to believe 
that some human behavior somehow exits the "causal stream." To explain in 
detail why selective causation/selective excuse is an unconvincing and ulti-
mately patronizing argument would require a lengthy digression from this 
essay's primary purpose. I have made this argument in detail elsewhere and 
shall simply assert here that good arguments do not support this position. 8 
The second attack on the determinist reductio claims that only abnormal 
causes, including psychopathological and physiopathological variables, excuse. 
Although this argument appears closer to the truth, it is a variant of selective 
determinism and suffers from the defects of that approach. Pathology can 
produce an excusing condition, but when it does it is the excusing condition that 
does the work, not the existence of a pathological cause per se. Consider again 
the delusional self-defender, who kills in response to the delusionally mistaken 
belief that she is about to be killed. Human action to save one's life is not a 
mechanistic , literally irresistible cause of behavior, and crazy beliefs are no 
more compelling than noncrazy beliefs. The killing is perfectly intentional-the 
delusional belief provides the precise reason to form the intention to kill. 
Moreover, the killing is al so not compelled simply because the belief is pathologi-
cally produced. A nondelusional but unreasonably mistaken self-defender, who 
fee ls the same desire to save her own life, would have no excuse for killing. A 
desire to save one 's own life furnishes an excusing condition only under very 
limited circumstances. There is also nothing wrong with our defender's "will," 
properly understood as an intentional executory state that translates desires and 
beliefs into action. 9 The defender's will operated quite effe ctively to effectuate 
her desire to live when she believed that she needed to kill to survive. Nor does 
our delusional self-defender lack " free will " simply because she is abnormal. I 
don't know what free will is in any case, and it is often just a placeholder for the 
conclusion that the agent supposedly lacking thi s desirable attribute ought to be 
exc used. The real reason our delusional self-defender ought to be excused, of 
course, is that she is not capable of rationality on this occasion . This is the 
genuine excusing condition that distinguishes her from the nondelusional but 
unreasonably mi staken se lf-defender. 
When agents behave inexplicably irrationaliy, we frequently believe that 
underlying pathology produces the inationality, but it is the irrationality, not the 
7. Peter Strawson , Freedom and Resen ltnenl, in F REE 'vV!l.L 59, SO (Gary Watson ed .. 1982) . 
St rawson uses the term ··panicky"" to desc ri be libertari an metaph ysics ge nerall y. bu t it appli es equall y 
we ll in this context. The sekcti ve cleterminisc"s belief that oni y the small subset of people who are 
allegedl y de termined shouid be excused enta ils the corresponding beli ef that the majority of people 
who are held responsible have li bertari<ln . contracausa l freedom. 
8. For the full argument, see Stephen J. Mo rse. Psr chologr. D:! le nninism ond Lega l Responsibi!ilT, 
in THE L A W .".S .\ BEI-!.WIORAL I NSTRUMENT 35.50-54 (Gary 8. Melton cd .. l lJ86). 
9. S!!e MICH.". EL S. MOORE. A CT Ai'; D CRI~·I E : TH E P ii !LOSOPHY OF ACT ION AN D ITS IM PLICATIONS FOR 
CR i ~li:~ . \ L LAw I i 3-oS ( 1993) (p rov iding a comple te acco un t and defense of the cla im that the will is an 
inte ntional c.xecutory state). 
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pathology, that excuses. After all, pathology does not always produce an 
excusing condition, and when it does not, there is no reason to excuse the 
resultant conduct. To see why, imagine a case in which pathology is a but-for 
cause of rational behavior. Consider a person with paranoid fears for her 
personal safety, who is therefore hypervigilant to cues of impending danger. 
Suppose on a given occasion she accurately perceives such a cue and kills 
properly to save her life . If she had not been pathologically hypervigilant, she 
would have missed the cue and been killed. She is perfectly responsible for this 
rational, justifiable homicide. Or take the case of a hypomanic businessperson, 
whose manic energy and heightened powers are a but-for cause of making an 
extremely shrewd deal. Assume that business conditions later change unforesee-
ably and the deal is now a loser. The deal was surely rational and uncompelled 
when it was made, and no sensible legal system would later void it because the 
businessperson was incompetent to contract. Even when pathology is uncontro-
versially a but-for cause of behavior, that conduct will be excused only if an 
independent excusing condition, such as irrationality or compulsion, is present. 
Even a highly abnormal cause will not excuse unless it produces an excusing 
condition. 
V. BRAIN AN D BLAME 
The foregoing analysis of excusing conditions applies straightforwardly to 
cases in which brain or nervous system pathology is part of the causal chain of 
intentional behavior. To begin, bi ological causation will only be part of the 
causal determinants of any intentional conduct, which is always mediated by 
one 's culture, language, and the like. The best accounts of the rel ation between 
brain and behavior suggest that no discrete bit of physiology always and 
everywhere produces exactl y the same intentional conduct in all human beings 
experiencing that physiological state, that no stimulus produces exactly the 
same brain states in all people responding to it, and that no bit of exactly the 
same behavior emitted by different people is attended by exactly the same brain 
state in all the similarly behaving agents. For example, the same pathophysiologi-
cal (or psychopathological) processes may produce delusional beliefs in all 
people with the processes, but the delusional content and resultant behavior of 
delusional, thi rteenth-century subcontinental Indians wi ll surely differ from that 
of delusional, late-twentieth-century Americans. For a second intu itive example, 
consider the demonstration about hand-raising discussed previously. 10 Large 
numbers of people behave (approximately) exactl y the same for the same 
reasons in response to the same stimulus. It is implausible to assume that their 
brains and nervous systems are in identical biophysical states. In sum, biologi-
cal variables will rarely be the sole determi nants of intentional human action. 
More funda mentally, biological causation will not excuse per se, because 
I 0. See supra text ::tccompan yi ng notes 3-4. 
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people are biological creatures and biology is always part of the causal chain for 
everything we do. If biological causation excused, no one would be responsible. 
Intentional human action and neuropathologically produced human movements 
are both biologically driven, yet they are conceptually, morally, and legally 
distinguishable. Moreover, if biology were "all" the explanation and everything 
else, including causal reasons for action, were simply epiphenomenal-as the 
eliminative materialists claim-then our entire notions of ourselves and respon-
sibility would surely alter radically. But eliminative materialism is philosophi-
cally controversial, 11 and science furnishes no reason to believe that it is true. 
Indeed, it is not clear conceptually that science could demonstrate that it is true. 
Thus, until the doctor comes and convinces us that our normati ve belief in 
human agency and responsibility is itself pathological , biological causation per 
se does not excuse. 
Abnormal biological causation also does not excuse per se. Human action can 
be rational or inational, uncompelled or compelled, whether its causes are 
" normal" or "abnormal." Whatever the causes of human action may be, they 
will ultimately be expressed through reasons for action, which are the true 
objects of responsibility analysis. Suppose, for example , that a confirmed brain 
lesion, such as a tumor, is a but-for cause of behavior. That is, let us suppose 
that a particular piece of undesirable behavior would not have occuned if the 
agent never had the tumor. Make the further, strong assumption that once the 
tumor is removed, the probability that this agent will reoffend drops to zero . 
Although one's strong intuition may be that thi s agent is not responsible for the 
undesirable behavior, the given assumptions do not entail the conclusion that 
the agent should be excused. The undesirable behavior is human action, not a 
literall y irresistible mechanism, and the causal role of the brain tumor does not 
necessarily mean that the behavior was inational or compelled. 
Moreover, it is a mi stake to assume that specific brain pathology inevi tab ly 
produces highly specific, complex intentional act ion. Certain areas of the brain 
do control general functions. For example, Broca's area in the left frontal lobe 
controls the ability to comprehend and produce appropriate language. A sufficient 
lesion in this site produces and enables us to predict aphasi a. But there is no 
region or site in the frontal lobes or anywhere else in the brain that controls 
specific , complex intentional actions . No lesion enables us to explain causall y or 
to predict an agent 's reasons and consequent intentional action in the same 
direct, prec ise way that a lesion in Broca's area permits the explanation or 
predicti on of aphasia. Neurological lesions can dissociate bodily movements 
from apparent intentions, producing automatisms and simil ar " unconscious" 
states . 11 But such states rarely produce criminal conduct, and when they do, the 
11. See Galen Strawson . Consciousness. Free Will. and the Unimponance of" Dnenninism. 32 
INQUIRY 3 (1989) (c laiming that reducti ve phys icali sm about the mind is ··moonshine ·· ). See generollr 
JOHN R. SEAR l.E. THE R EDISCOVERY OF THE M IND ( 1992) (prov iding an exte nded argument for the 
irreducible reality of mind ). 
12. I th ank Norman R. Rei kin. M.D .. Ph.D., for making thi s point to me particular ly clearly. 
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agent is exculpated. In these cases we need not even reach the issue of whether 
the agent 's intentional action is rational, because action itself is lacking. 13 The 
story relating brain or nervous system pathology to intentional conduct will be 
far more complicated and far less direct than the already complicated correspon-
dence between brain and nervous system lesions and the reduction or loss of 
general functions. 
Brain or other nervous system pathology affects agents more generally. 
Suppose, for example, that the tumor in the previous example makes the agent 
irritable or emotionally labile. Such emotional states surely make it harder for 
any agent to fly straight in the face of other criminogenic variables, such as 
provocation or stress, but per se they do not render an agent irrational. Other 
agents may be equally irritable or labile as the resul t of environmental variables, 
such as the loss of sleep and stress associated with, say, taking law exams or 
trying an important, difficult, lengthy case. But these people would not be 
excused if they offended while in an uncharacteristic emotional state, unless that 
state sufficiently deprived them of rationality. People with criminogenically 
predisposing congenital abnormalities or lifelong character traits would have 
even less excuse for undesirable behavior, because they had the time and 
experience to learn to deal with those aspects of themselves that made fl ying 
straight harder. 
Consider the case of Charles Whitman, who killed many victims by shooting 
passersby from the top of the tower on the University of Texas campus. He 
suffered from a brain tumor, and let us assume that we could demonstrate 
incontrovertibly that he would not have shot if he had not suffered from the 
tumor. But whether he is nonethe less responsible depends not on the but-for 
causation of hi s homicides, but on his reasons for action. lf Whitman believed, 
for example, that mass murder of innocents wou ld produce eternal peace on 
earth, then he should be excused, whether the delusional belief was a product of 
brain pathology, childhood trauma, or whatever. But if Whitman was simpl y an 
angry person who believed that life had dealt him a raw deal and that he was 
going to go out in a blaze of glory that would give his mi serable life meaning, 
then he is unfortunate but responsible, whether hi s anger and beliefs were a 
product of the tumor, childhood trauma, an unfortunate character, or whatever. 
All human action is, in part , the product of but-for causes over which agents 
have no con trol and wh ich they are powerless to change, including their genetic 
endowments and the nature and context of their chilclrearing. If people hac! 
differe nt genes, different parents, and different cultures, they would be differen t. 
Moreover, situational determinants over which agents have no con trol are 
but- fo r causes of much behavior. A victim in the wrong place at the wrong time 
is as much a but-for cause of the mugging as the mugger 's genetics and 
experiences . If no victim were availab le, no mugging occurs, whatever the 
13. See. e.g .. M ODEL PENAL CODE * 2.0 l (2) (Proposed Ofti cia l Draft 1962) (stating that bodily 
movements tha t arc un conscious arc not voluntary acts) . 
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would-be mugger's intentions. Such considerations are treated by philosophers 
under the rubric , "moral luck." 14 Our characters and our opp011unities are in 
large measure the product of luck, and if luck excused, no one would be 
responsible. A brain tumor or other neuropathology that enhances the probabil-
ity of the sufferer engaging in antisocial behavior is surely an example of 
dreadful bad luck. But unless the agent is inational or the behavior is com-
pelled, there is no reason to excuse the agent simply because bad luck in the 
form of biological pathology played a causal role . A cause is just a cause. It is 
not per se an excuse. 
VI. "SPYDER CYSTKOPF" 
Spyder Cystkopf was charged with second degree murder for killing his wife, 
Brunhilda, on January 7, 1991. According to Cystkopf, he and Brunhilda had 
been arguing about their chi ldren, and she became enraged and scratched his 
face. During the ensuing fight, he struck her a number of times, she fell to the 
floor, and he strangled her to death. Cystkopf then arranged the crime scene to 
make Brunhilda's death appear to be a suicide, including throwing her out the 
thirteenth story window of their home. Forensic pathological evidence sug-
gested that Brunhilda was perhaps alive when she hit the pavement. 15 Cystkopf 
pled legal insanity and used evidence that he had a sub-arachnoid cyst! 6 to 
claim that the normal functioning of his brain was impaired. 
Cystkopf was a sixty-four year old "semi-retired" advertising executive. He 
had no previous history of violent conduct and no criminal record. In 1948 he 
suffered from various neurological abnormalities , including migrai ne and what 
was described as a sei zu re that caused disorientation, difficulty finding words . 
and an :::tbnorrnal reflex. Medical tests found nothing \Vrong of neurological 
significance, and Cystkopf was discharged with a diagnosis of suspected congeni-
tal cerebral aneurism. hom the 1948 discharge until the homicide in 1991 , 
Cystkopf suffered from no neurological problems or disorders. 
14. See generallY MORA L LUCK (Daniel Statman eel .. 1993) lco llect ing class ic arti c les ::Jdclress ing the 
topic). 
15. The cxplar.ati on for this rinding most sympathetic to Cystkopf is that Bmnhilda was only 
unconscious from the strangling when Cystkopf defenestrated her, but he nonetheless bel ieved that she 
was de::Jcl. If thi s is true, criminal law buffs will immediatel y recognize a neat c::Jusation problem. The 
intentionally homicid::JI act-strangling- did not in fact cause Brunhilda's death. The intentional act 
that in fa ct killed Brunhilc!::J--dcfenestration- was on ly ne gl igent at most concerning death. So should 
Cystkopf be charged with intentional homicide or with attempted homicide') See Thabo Me li v. 
Reginam, I All E.R. 373 ( 1954) (holding that when defendants mi st::Jkenly thought victim \Vas dead and 
then kill ed victim by a second ::Jet, defendants were gu ilty of murder because the eve nts could not be 
separated). For those who do not understand why results matter. this is al l beside the point. of course. 
See . e.g .. Sanford H. Kadis h. Th e Sup reme Courr Re\·ie11·, Foreumd: Th e Criminal Law and !he Luck o( 
!he Dmw. 84 J. (Rt;·.1. L. & CR 1\·11NOLOG Y 679 ( 1994) (arguing that re,ults have no bearing on an 
offender \ cu lpability and that reducing punishment if h::Jrm does not re sult is irrati onal). 
16. A sub-arachnoid cyst is a fluid -filled tissue sac just beneath the middle leve l of the protective 
linings that sunound the br::J in. The cyst is thus net wi thin the brain itself. Most such cysts arc probably 
congenital. See Martell , supra note l. at i 3. 
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As a person with far more resources than the average murder defendant, 
Cystkopf was able to retain excellent private counsel and numerous experts. He 
was evaluated psychiatrically, neurologically, and neuropsychologically. Virtu-
ally all the evaluations produced normal results, and none produced significant 
abnormalities. Cystkopf also underwent various brain-imaging procedures, which 
disclosed the presence of the sub-arachnoid cyst and significant, but possibly 
artifactual, decreases in cerebral metabolism in regions of the brain adjacent to 
the cyst. In light of these findings, Cystkopf's local experts referred him for 
further evaluation to Dr. Antonio Damasio's well-known neurological and 
cognitive neuroscience team at the University of Iowa College of Medicine. 17 
Damasio's findings and theories were the crux of Cystkopf's legal insanity 
claim. The size and location of the sub-arachnoid cyst were confirmed once 
again. Neuropsychological testing indicated mild defects in "executive control" 
functions, including prospective memory, sequential learning, and flexible re-
sponding to changing environmental contingencies. Most important, Damasio 
found that Cystkopf's ability to "mark" appropriate behavioral response options 
with a signal was impaired. Damasio had previously suggested and tested on a 
small number of subjects the hypothesis that some adults with acquired frontal 
lobe damage and sociopathic behavioral changes suffer an impairment in the 
ability to "mark [the implications of social situations] with a signal that would 
automatically distinguish advantageous from pernicious actions, in the perspec-
tive of social rules and current contingencies." 18 Consequently, such people 
allegedly have diminished ability to guide their conduct with appropriate re-
sponses, even if their ab ility cognitively to conjure up such responses is 
unimpaired. 19 Because Cystkopf's performance on the experimental protocol 
was similar to those of the brain-damaged experimental subjects in the earlier 
study, Damasio concluded that Cystkopf suffered from "a pathological diminu-
tion of autonomic responses to highly charged social/affective stimuli, in a 
nonverbal paradigm." 20 Damasio's final report noted that Cystkopf's response-
killing-and his wife's provocation were both unusual. Further, the report 
17. For expositional ease. I shall henceforth refer to all findings and opinions as Dr. Damasio's. 
although others at Iowa contributed to Cystkopf's multidisciplinary evaluations. 
18. Antonio R. Damasio et a!.. Jndil •idua/s ll"ith Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage 
Fail to Respond Autcmomicall\- to Social Stimuli. 41 BEHAVIOURAL BRAIN REs. 81. 82 ( 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Damasio et al., Individuals]. Damasio"s theory has been termed the '·somatic marker ·· theory. The 
study used a sample of five experimental and six control subjects. 
Damasio's wider goal is to provide a thoro ughly biological account of how psychology is possible, 
including subjectivity, the most notoriously dillicult psychological experience to explain. Damasio 
presents a complete general account in ANTONIO DAiVIAS10. DESCARTES' ERROR: E\mTI00J. RE.\SO~ AND 
THE HUMAN BRAIN ( 1994) I hereinafter DML\SIO. DESC\RTES · ERROR]. The further testing of the somatic 
marker theory is also discussed. !d. at ?.05-22. 
19. !n Damasio ·s words: "Because they arc c!epri ved of a natural qualifying marker. they must 
depend instead on a reasoned cost-benefit analysis of numerous and often conflictual options (involving 
both immediate and future consequences). The adequacy and speed of response selection are degraded 
accordingly ... Damasio eta!., !ndi\'iduals. supm note 18. at 82. 
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asse11ed: "It is reasonable to assume that his inability to respond correctly is 
part of the same defect that so limits hi s emotional and psychophysiological 
responses, and also that such a defect is due to his long-standing neurological 
condition." 2 1 
Armed with these findings and hypotheses about Cystkopf, the defense 
claimed that Cystkopf's cyst had been inexorably growing, perhaps throughout 
his life, and finally, in response to the alleged argument with and scratching by 
his wife, Cystkopf was "unable to select the most appropriate response option" 
because he had "pathological alterations in [his] modulation of social behav-
ior." As a result, Cystkopf allegedly lacked substantial capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of hi s actions. 22 
Cystkopf was not raising a "standard" insanity defense, because he lacked a 
diagnosis of major mental disorder and grossly psychotic symptoms. Both are 
usually practically required to support an insanity defense, and the law some-
times requires the presence of severe mental disorder to raise the defense. 
Nevertheless, I believe that Cystkopf raised a colorable insanity claim. No 
diagnosis or symptoms necessarily entail that the agent is not legally respon-
sible, as the American Psychiatric Association's official diagnostic manual 
admits ? 3 The genuine basis for the excuse is noncu lpable inationality. Cystkopf 
should be excused if he can demonstrate that the tumor (or anything else) 
rendered him nonculpably irrational when he killed hi s wife, even if hi s mental 
state does not fi t traditional definitions of major mental disorder. 24 
Before addressing Cystkopf's moral and legal responsibility for killing hi s 
wife, let us review what we reasonably believe, what we would like to know. 
and what is speculative. We reasonably believe that ( 1) Cystkopf killed hi s wife 
by either strangling or defenestrating her; (2) Cystkopf had no history either of 
any vio lent conduct whatsoever or of any signs or symptoms of neurological 
disorder since 1948; and (3) Cystkopf had a sub-arachnoid cyst that may have 
decreased his cerebral metabolism in the region adjacent to the cyst. What we 
would like to know is a very large category, but it includes at ieast the 
fo llowing: (l) a detailed account of exactly what the fight was about and what 
was Cystkopf's mental state \Vhen he attacked hi s wife; (2) a detailed, intimate 
21. !d. at 20. 
22. Indeed. one defense psychi atri st opined that it was ··imposs ible·· for Cys tkopf to do so. M 
23. AMERICAN PsYCHJATRIC Ass·N. DJAG'IOSTJC .-\ND STiHISTJCAL MANUAL or: MENTAL DJSORDERS at 
x.x iii -xxiv. xxvii (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-lV !. See genera/h· Stephen J. Morse, Failed E'tplww · 
rions and Cri111inaf Re.\fJIJI/siiJi!itr: Experr.1 ond rile Unconsciou s, 68 VA . L. REV. 971, I 048 -50. I 059-70 
( 198 2) (arguing that diagnoses and symptoms alone cannot dete rmine whether an agent is lega ll y 
responsible) . 
24. Cystkopf might have tried to grou nd his insanity claim in a diagnosis of ·'episod ic clyscontrol. ., 
Although not a part of the ofticial d iagnostic nomenclature. !t is a diagnostic term that has been in 
vog ue and is :;ometimes still used . For various reasons. howe ve r. the '·d iagnosis·· is unsati sfactory. See 
Philip Lucas. Episodic DYsconrml: ,-\ Loof.: Bock ur Ange r. 5 J. FORENS IC PSYCHJ ATRY 37 1 ( 199-1-) 
(ch::d lenging the val idity of the syndrome) . Cys tkopf"s history does not support the official diagnosis of 
··Intermittent Explosive Disorder· · because there were not multiple epi sodes of disproporti onately 
'i iolent outbursts. See DSM-IV, supro note :2.\ . at 609-1:2. 
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history of Cystkopf's long- and short-term relations with his wife; (3) a detailed 
account of Cystkopf's usual behavior in a variety of usual and unusual contexts, 
including stressful and conftictual situations; ( 4) the statistically normative 
behavioral abnormalities, especially violent conduct, exhibited by people with 
Cystkopf's alleged neurological and neuropsychological abnormalities; and (5) 
the percentage of those with Cystkopf's pathological lesions and test results 
who demonstrate no behavioral abnormalities in general and no abnormal 
violence in particular. 
The three most important speculations concern the causal role of the cyst in 
the homicidal behavior, the validity of Damasio's theory in general, and the 
application of Damasio's theory to Cystkopf in particular. These are speculative 
for a number of reasons. First, there is no way to confirm that the cyst played a 
but-for causal role, especially because we have no evidence that this apparently 
lifelong abnormality ever produced any other untoward conduct. Moreover, we 
do know both that most people with such cysts do not engage in homicidal 
behavior and that many people without abnormalities uncharacteristically "lose 
it" on a single occasion and do dreadful things. Second, Damasio's theory 
suffers from a number of defects, including vague formulation, limited experi-
mental verification, and unknown ecological validity. Third, even if valid, 
Damasio's theory and findings may not apply to Cystkopf, because he differs 
importantly from Damasio's exp-erimental subjects. 25 
Despite the large gaps in the factual, scientific, and clinical evidence, I will 
make the following simplifying assumptions, which are all sympathetic to 
Cystkopf's excusing claim: ( l) Cystkopf killed his wife intentionally, but in a 
state of extreme emotional disturbance for which his wife's provocative behav-
ior may have been a reasonable explanation or excuse; 26 (2) Cystkopf and his 
wife had a generally harmonious relationship that was not a dormant but 
pressure-filled "volcano," ready to erupt if the pressure increased; (3) Cystkopf 
was a characteristically even-tempered person, not given to rages and other 
highly emotional responses to stresses and provocations; (4) despite the cau-
tions of the "method skeptics," 27 all the neuropsychological findings are valid; 
(5) Damasio's theory is correct in general; and (6) Cystkopf had impaired 
ability to mark the appropriate responses to conflictual situations. The lack of 
infom1ation that generated the need for these simplifying assumptions is paradoxi-
cally beneficial. It allows us to consider the appropriate role of the neurological 
claim unclistracted by facts that might undermine it and our consequent willing-
25. The differences arc discussed infi·o note 44 and accompanying text. 
26. This is consistent with New York's definition of murder in the second degree. \Vith which 
Cystkopf was charged. See N.Y. PE:~ -\I LAw ~ i 25.25 (Me Kinney 1987 & Supp. 1996 ). 
27. For the most thoroughly skeptical and complete critique. sec D.·\VID FAUST ET AI .. , BR.-'.1'; 
0.-'.~IAGE CLAili!S: COPING WITH NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE ( 1991 ). Sa also Jeffery T. Barth eta!. , 
Forensic NeuropsYcholog_\'.' A ReplY to the /v!ethod Skeptics, 2 NEUROPSYCH. REV. 251 ( 1992) (admitting 
problems with neuropsychological methods and findings. but answering :;kcptics). 
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ness to understand the relevance of such claims in general. Now, how should we 
assess Cystkopf 's moral and legal responsibility for killing his wife? 
Cystkopf is not claiming that he was unconscious or suffering from so-called 
sane or insane automatism when he killed his wife. That is, he is neither 
denying the act requirement of the ptima facie case, nor is he raising essentially 
the same claim as an affi rmative defense. 2 s The killer, Cystkopf, was not a 
mechanism, that is, literally physically compelled to perform the bodily move-
ments that caused his wife's death. His deed was conscious, intentional, and 
motivated by reasons for action. Moreover, highly unusual and extreme provoca-
tion that creates extreme emotional disturbance and is the but-for cause of 
responsive behavior does not fumish a compulsion excuse. At most, as Cyst-
kopf's charge reflects , it provides a partial excusing condition that reduces the 
degree of homicide. Any possible full y excusing condition will thus require 
analysis of his reasons for action and whether that action was either sufficiently 
irrational or otherwise sufficien tly co mpelled. 
Given our assumptions, Cystkopf's reason for killing hi s wife appears rela-
tively apparent. 29 Unusually provoked and enraged by their argument and by 
her assaultive scratching, he desired her death and formed the intention to 
effectuate his desire. The only unusual aspect of his behavior, of course, is that 
he acted on the desire to kill. Intense rage and the desire to kill or destroy the 
objects of our rage are hardly unusual. In response to such feelings and urges, 
people may utter angry words, perform sub-homicidal ac tions, or sometimes 
consciously or unconsciously turn their anger towards themselves in various 
direct and indirect ways. They se ldom kill, however. Cystkopf surely experi-
enced such feelings in hi s four decades of ad ulthood prior to the homicide, 
possibly on many occasions, but he never assaulted those who enraged him. It is 
reasonable to assume that, like most people, Cystkopf used various techniques 
to avoid turn ing antisocial desire into anti social action. Among these would be 
his internal moral sense, his conscience, and his fear of various external 
sanc tions. 30 
Cystkopf faced an unusual challenge and fa iled. Peoples' repertoires for 
fly ing straight vary within and among people from time to time. Some people 
have more of the right stuff that operates as a defense to antisoc ial conduct, and 
28 . Perh aps Cystkopf should have c laimed tha t he did no t 8C t. argu ing that intense rage produced a 
d issociati ve state of automati sm. Cf Ke ith R ix & Alan C larkson. Depersono li z.ation und Int ent, 5 J. 
FoRENSI C P SYCI!I r\TRY 409 ( 1994) (prese nti ng a case poss ibl y like Cystkopf's and suggest ing that 
automati sm or in sanity is the appropriate defe nse) . To address thi s iss ue full y requires mo re know ledge 
than we possess o f C ys tkopfs mental sta te a t th e time o f th e homicide. 
29. In wh at follows. I do no t mean to ex hau st the entire range of poss ible ex plana ti ons for 
Cys tkopf' s behavior or all poss ible inferences that mi ght be draw n from the ev idence. The goal is to 
apply the proper conceptual fra mework fm rhink i ng abo ut th e case. with in wh ich diffe re nt arguments 
can of course be made. 
30. See genera/h· Stephe n J. Morse. Culpo/;ili!Y ond Conrrul. 142 U . PA. L. REv. 1587. 1605- 10 
( 1994) (di sc uss in g usual mea ns people use to "ll y straight' ' ). 
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situational variables can either reinforce or weaken the characteristic level of 
the right stuff. In addition, different situations exert differential criminogenic 
effect by providing greater or lesser opportunities for offending. People with 
less of the right stuff who face more criminogenic situations will find it harder 
to fly straight than people with more of the right stuff who face fewer challeng-
ing situations. 
But all people, including those with little of the right stuff and those consis-
tently exposed to the strongest challenges to flying straight, are nonetheless held 
responsible if they possess the capacity for rational conduct and their conduct is 
not compelled. Even if Cystkopf had never before been so provoked and 
enraged and even if the homicide would not have occurred but for the unique 
circumstances, he should be held responsible unless he lacked the capacity for 
rational conduct, that is, the ability to be guided by good reasons. Simply to 
conclude that he is not responsible because he had a biological abnormality and 
because he acted so seemingly uncharacteristically begs precisely the question 
of capacity that we must now address. 
'Ne have assumed that Cystkopf had impaired capacity properly to mark the 
appropriate response to situations he confronted and that this impairment made 
it difficult for him to guide hi s conduct appropriately in conflictual situations. 
He may have had lots of other types of the right stuff, but to some degree he 
lacked this type. In hi s case, the impairment was apparently caused by biologi-
cal abnormalities, but the causal story is of little relevance per se. Suppose the 
same impairment were caused by an unfortunate chi ldhood or by situational 
stress in an otherwise entirely normal person. The moral and legal issue would 
be the same. 
The real question is whether this impairment undermines rationality suffi-
ciently to excuse the agent. To answer it, we must consider Damasio 's theory in 
more detail. The "somatic marker " theory attempts to account in part for 
functional, socially advantageous human interaction that takes place in time-
pressured, conflictual situations. In such cases, there is seldom time for the 
luxury of complete cost-benefit analysis of all the positive and negative reasons 
for alternative courses of action. To help guide our behavioral responses effi-
ciently to charged social situations, the intact person has affective as well as 
cognitive reactions. Having the right emotional reactions automatically sets 
neural mechanisms in motion that signal prior punishment and reward experi-
ences to our higher-order control systems. As a result, "the consequences of 
puni shment and reward can be experienced consciously as 'feelings' and ·erno-
tions. ' " 3 1 When a social situation reactivates the previously learned somatic 
states that mark berulVioral responses, 
[t]hey mark unambiguously not only the value of current perceptions, but 
most importantly, the value of certain outcomes to given courses of acti on .... 
31. Damasio et al.. lndil ·iduols. supra note 18. at 83. 
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Somatic states provide an automated way for the brain to select, consciously 
and not consciously, among response options. On the one hand, it would link 
a given response option with both the pleasure that it may bring immediately, 
and the punishment that it will lead to in the fu ture. By forcing attention on a 
conflict, a pertinent somatic marker would signal the ultimately deleterious 
consequences that might arise from a response that might nonetheless bring 
immediate reward .32 
543 
This neural repertoire permits the person consciously to suppress negative 
responses in favor of more advantageous alternatives, and equally important, it 
induces "non-conscious inhibition of excitatory subcortical neurotransmitter 
systems which mediate appetitive behaviors." 33 People with an impaired mark-
ing system may be fully capable of reasoning correctly about even subtle 
hypothetical social problems presented verbally. But in conftictual, time-
pressured situations, an impaired marking system increases the probability of 
choosing a disadvantageous or dysfunctional response because the agent lacks 
the emotional information that helps more fortunately endowed people fly 
straight. 34 
Even stripped of the neural details , it is perfectly plausible to assume that 
having the right emotional responses to situations eases the task of behaving 
appropriately or functionally. 35 This assumption is fully consistent with our 
view of ourselves as creatures who are capable of rational practical reasoning. 
Nothing in the concepts of rationality and practical reasoning suggests that 
emotions are not appropriate components of rational action. We rarely have time 
and probably few have the ability ever to be entirely cool, fully logical 
reasoners. Nature surely has provided us with a " down and dirty " set of 
32. !d. 
33. ld 
34. Damasio 's th eory cou ld be characterized as a psychophys iological account of ' ' impulsi vity.·· 
Thi s charac ter ization has the desirable feature of permitting us to relate Damas io 's work to much other 
theori zing and research that hypothesizes a posi ti ve causal relation between impul sivity and criminal or 
other socially disadvantageous behavior. See. e.g .. l'v!ICH;\EL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A 
GE!\ERAL TH EO RY OF CRI:Vt E 85-1 20 ( 1990) (ex plaining theory that lack of self-con trol can lead to 
criminal behav ior) . Although the assoc iation between steep time di scounting and maladapti ve conduct 
seems intuitively plausible, there arc problems with the concept of impul sivity. Sec JAN VOLc\VKA , 
NEUROI3IOLOGY OF VtOLEi\'CE 180-81 ( 1995) (explaining theory of impulse control and noting that it is 
not uniform ly defined); William G. McCown & Philip A. DeSimone. Impulses. !mpulsivirr. and 
Impulsive Behaviors: A Historical Revie\\' of' a Contemporary Issu e. in TH E li'v!PULSIV E CLI ENT: THEORY, 
RESE.-\ RCH , AND TR EATMENT 3, S (Willi am G. McCown et a l. eds. , 1993). For the purpose of argument, 
however, let us assume th at impul sivity is one sensib le and less '"jargony" term to char3cteri ze the 
problem of people with somatic marking defic its. 
35. Although Damas io·s theory co ncern~ the effect of frontal lobe damage on the ability to 
experience appropri ate emotions at all. I also presume that the marking system is impaired if a person 
has learned inappropriate markers. For exampl e. there are people who appear to fe e l relati ve ly 
una ll oyed pleasure when they anti cipate the intlicti on of sufferin g. pain , or puni shment. A contlicwal 
situation might full y activate the markers of such people. bu t the probability of choos ing a socially 
di sadvantageous response wou ld increase. just as it does in people with dimini shed somatic markers. 
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techniques for speedy, generally successful, real-time action choices,36 and the 
ability to experience and to use one 's own emotional data is credibly one of 
them. Some might prefer to conceptualize the consequences of somatic marking 
problems as "volitional" or as problems with the "will," but there is usually 
nothing wrong with an impulsive agent's executory ability to translate desires, 
beliefs, and intentions into action. Self-control problems of volitionally unim-
paired agents are better understood as rationality defects. 37 For example, it is 
precisely the lack of the ability properly to use emotional data that allegedly 
accounts for the so-called "psychopath's" propensity for anti social conduct and 
seeming inability to learn from negative consequences. Psychopaths, however, 
do not have volitional problems. I shall therefore discuss Cystkopf's responsibil-
ity in terms of rationality. 
Before addressing the normative consequences of assuming that Damasio's 
theory is true and that Spyder Cystkopf had impaired emotional responses in , 
conftictual, real-world situations, it is necessary to make a few further assump-
tions. The capacity properly to mark responses somatically, to experience the 
right emotional data, like virtually all human capacities, is surely distributed 
along a continuum among human beings. We don't know the shape of the curve, 
but it is reasonable to assume that some people have maximal capacity, others 
have none or almost none, and most people are somewhere in between. And, 
presumably, there is an inverse relation between the degree of marking impair-
ment and , to use Damasio's terms, the "adequacy and speed of response 
selection. " 38 It is conceivable, of course, but implausible, that this is a binary, 
all-or-none capacity. Assume further that a wide range of variables, including, 
inter alia, genetic defects, faulty conditioning, and trauma can produce the 
impairment. Finally, let us plausibly assume that the somatic marking mecha-
ni sm is not the only intrapersonal variable that affects the probability that agents 
will choose socially advantageous actions. If an agent's other capacities that 
guide action are reasonably intact, then the right response may not be so 
dit1icult to achieve after all. Indeed, awareness of defects that render the agent a 
potentially loose cannon on the deck may enable the agent to adopt compensa-
tory coping mechanisms that mitigate or even obviate the defect. We are now 
ready to address properly Cystkopf's responsibility. 
Remember that the capacity for rationality is a precondition for moral and 
legal responsibility. Discussion of Cystkopf 's responsibility must therefore 
begin with the prior, entirely normative question of whether and how much the 
ability to experience the right emotions in conflictual and potentially conflictual 
situations is a criterion of rationality. For example, many consider psychopaths 
36. See DANIEL C. DENNETT. D ,.\RWIN's D ANG EROUS IDEA: E VOI.UTION AN D T il E fYIEANII':GS OF LIFE 
505-10 ( 1995 ) (s uggesting th at e thi cal refl ec ti on on courses of ac ti on mu st prov ide mech ani sms for 
··bru te"' and " a-rati o na l" ' termin a ti on o f re fl ec ti o n). 
37 . Morse, supra note 30. at 1595-605. Some cases of lac k uf se lf-co nt rol do s te m from voliti onal 
de fec ts, but most do not. ld at 1597-98 . 
38 . Dam.asio et al.. lndil'idu a/s. supm note IS. at 82. 
1996] BRA IN AND BLAME 545 
to be inational, even though psychopaths cognitively comprehend the facts 
about the world, including the legal rules and their consequences. Purely 
cognitive knowledge, divorced from its emotional context, is allegedly insuffi-
cient for moral rationality. The psychopath is "morally insane." 39 Others 
disagree, claiming, for example , that psychopaths are rational and should be 
held responsible unless they lack selfish feelings, which is unlikely. 4° Cunent 
criminal law holds psychopaths responsible, despite the arguments that such 
people lack moral rationality. 41 
Understanding the proper way to assess Cystkopf's responsibility requires 
only that we appreciate the normative nature of the relation between a particular 
impairment, however it is caused, and the moral and legal conception of 
rationality. If one believes that unimpaired marking is not a criterion of reason-
able rationality, then Cystkopf 's claim for excuse is immediately blocked: If his 
impairment does not negate the capacity for rational conduct, there is no moral 
or legal purchase for his claim. Cystkopf's condition raises a colorable claim 
only if we decide that impaired marking mechani sms undermine rationality. But 
we need not resolve the debate. Instead, let us assume for the purpose of 
discussion that somatic marking is relevant to our conception of rationality. 
The next issue to be investigated would be Cystkopf 's total capaci ty for 
rational conduct, considering all hi s cognitive and affective repertoires, includ-
ing his marking capacities. We would want to know as much as possible about 
his real-world behavior in a variety of contexts, in addition to the medical and 
psychological findings. Rationality and responsibility are moral and legal , not 
medical or psychological, issues. The Jaw's central concern is how Cystkopf 
performs in the real world, not the structure of hi s brain or how he performs on 
various tests . 
Medical and psychological findings would provide rel atively direct evidence 
abo ut moral and legal criteria only if they are excellent prox ies fo r such 
standards. They are not good proxies , however, and are unlikely ever to be. 
Moral and legal cri teria are matters of normative meaning, and it is fanciful to 
assume that there will be a perfec t match, uniform among people, between 
discrete brain states and normative meanings concerning human action. Never-
theless, abnormal clinical , laboratory, and psychological test findings may add 
plausibility to claims concerning impairments in the capacity for rational con-
duct in natural contexts, especiall y if they can provide reasonably precise 
39. See, e.g., Susan Wolf, Saniry and !he .Meraphrsics of Responsibility, in RESPOi\SIBILITY, CHARAC-
TER, ,\ND THE E~·IOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MOR,\L PSYCHOLOGY 46, 58 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) . 
40 . See. e.g., Samuel H. Pill sbu ry. Th e ivfeaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Cho ice, 
Character and Responsibilitv, 67 IND. LJ. 719. 746-47 ( 1992) (argu ing that on ly psychopaths who lack 
selfi sh fee ling should be excused from crimina l responsibility) . 
~~ I. See. e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ~ 4.0 I (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ('' fT ]he terms 'mental 
di sease or defect ' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated crimina l or otherwise 
antisoc ial conduct." ). It is interesti ng. as Damasio himself rea lizes, that psychopaths and nonpsycho-
pathi c crimina ls respond si milarl y to experimental procedures li ke hi s. Dr\MASIO. DESCA RTES' ERROR, 
supra note 18, at 288. 
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estimates of a person's performance on relevant tasks that would permit compari-
son to people in general. They may, therefore , be relevant, provided they are 
reliable and valid. 
Intelligence tests present a classic, if controversial, example. People whose 
general behavior demonstrates obviously superior intelligence have no purely 
cognitive problem understanding moral and legal rules, and we need no I.Q. test 
to identify such people. In contrast, people with severe and profound developmen-
tal disabilities lack the cognitive ability fully to understand the rules and, once 
again, we need not test them to know this. Suppose, however, a defendant of 
limited intelligence claims that he did not appreciate the criminality or wrongful-
ness of his conduct and, in capital cases, that he does not deserve to die, even if 
he were criminally responsible. To support this claim, he offers evidence of his 
performance on a standard general intelligence test, which indicates that he 
scores in the bottom two percent of the population and has a mild or moderate 
developmental disability. This finding would not be dispositive on the issue of 
criminal responsibility or on death penalty mitigation in those states that 
(misguidedly) permit execution of developmentally disabled people. As the 
Supreme Court properly recognized, people with the same level of intellectual 
impairment can have different moral capacities.4 2 But the test result would 
surely be relevant and equally surely should be admissible. 
Thus, even if the science employed to gather medical and psychological 
findings is reliable and valid, such findings would still be inaccurate proxies for 
moral and legal criteria for respon sible action. To illustrate further, suppose 
Cystkopf's medical and psychological findings one month before the homicide 
would have been indi stinguishabl e from what they were at the time of the 
crime. Indeed, because all the findin gs were obtained after the homicide, the 
defense experts ' opinions about Cystkopf's condition at the time of the crime 
imply that they believe the results would have been the same or even less 
abnormal on the clay of the killing because the tumor was al!egediy growing. 
Suppose further that Cystkopf had a heated argument with his wife or had some 
other conflictual interaction a month before the crime, as he may well have had. 
It is reasonable to infer that on the prior occasion he chose the right response 
even though his abnormal neurological and psychological condition was measur-
ab ly the same as on the day of the killing. Despite the presence of the same 
abnormai findings, no one would consider Cystkopf not respons ible for the right 
response, and he would properly be prai:;ed for doi ng the right thing. 
The impress ive theori zing and extensive medical and psychological find ings 
about Cystkopf are unlikely to provide precise dnta concerning the level of his 
irnpairment in the capacity for rational conduct. There is no quantitative scale 
with which to compare him to normal or abnormal populations. All we know is 
tha t there is some defect of indeterminate rea l-world effect. Although the 
uncharacteristic homicidal behavior was not inconsistent with the defect, we 
-~2. Sa Penry v. Lynaugh . ..1.9:2 U.S . 302. 338 i! 980). 
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cannot even be sure that the defect played a causal role in the conduct. Opinions 
that it did or that it did not are both speculations, not confirmed scientific or 
clinical fact. Opinions based on the theory and findings that Cystkopf did or did 
not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or that it was or was not 
impossible for him to do so, are similarly speculative, not fact. Indeed, these are 
moral and legal conclusions, rather than clinical or scientific opinions. 
Let us review. Spyder Cystkopf's capacity for rational conduct on the day he 
killed his wife is the crucial issue. It is relevant but not dispositive that he had 
an abnormality that may have affected thi s capacity. Medical and psychological 
evide nce may help us decide if his capacity was affected, but it is not very 
precise evidence about incapacity, and it is surely not dispositive of the legal 
lSSUe . 
How can the average juror or judge decide whether Cystkopf was criminally 
responsible? Although the available case material is fru stratingly incomplete, 
jurors at the actual trial would surely have copious evidence concerning Cyst-
kopf's relevant behavioral hi story. They would have to judge in li ght of the 
circumstances of the crime, Cystkopf's full hi story, and the medical and psycho-
logical findings, whether Cystkopf's capacity for rational conduct was so 
impaired at the time of the crime that he substantially lacked the capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of hi s conduct. This is a normative, 
moral, and legal judgment they would make using common sense inferences 
about Cystkopf based on the evidence presented to them. vVhat more could we 
ask or want of jurors? 
Even with the inadequate data about Cystkopf and his hi story that we 
possess, we can make some observations that are relevant to deciding whether 
Cystkopf is responsible for killing his wife . First and foremost alt hough the 
defense experts agreed that Cystkopf had the cyst througho ut hi s life , he had 
never engaged in any previous violent conduct. This suggests, but does nor 
prove , that any behavioral effects the cyst produced did not previously reduce 
hi s capacity for rational conduct in general or predispose him to violence or 
other dysfunctional sociai behavior. There are, however, at least three possible 
responses to this suggesti on. First, the growing cyst produced increasing but 
unrecogn ized effects, which ultimately achieved a leve l that impaired his capac-
ity for rationa1ity ... u Second, he had never before been as provoked and enraged 
as he was by his wife on the day of the crin1.e. and thus hi s generally imp<~ired 
capacity for rationality had neve r been so sorely challenged . Third, both the 
cyst' s effects may have worsened and the provocati on may have uniquely tested 
him. 
The behav ioral history we have thus permits contrary interpretat ions of the 
crime. Cystkopf 's pacific past suggests that hi s capac ity for rat ional condu ct 
was not terribly impaired. Dreadfull y provoked by his wife, however, he lost hi s 
-1.3. Aga in. the lesi on did not specifically ztn u unmdiateuly pruducc homicidal intent ions ur the 
intent to vi olate a provision of the Ne'.\' York Penal Code . See SIIJ!m tex t accompanying notes I 0- ! .i. 
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temper and overreacted homicidally, as many normal people unfortunately do. 
If this is the right story, he should rightfully be convicted of second degree 
murder. On the other band, the killing is so uncharacteristic that perhaps it was 
the consequence of a uniquely unfortunate coincidence of worsening neuropathol-
ogy and extreme provocation, which together reduced his capacity for rational-
ity sufficiently to find him not responsible. Before deciding which of these two 
accounts is more likely accurate, we would want to know much more about 
Cystkopf's relationship with his wife, his history of responding to stress, and 
the circumstances of the crime. 
The Damasio theory and findings also point in opposite directions. Cystkopf 
perhaps had brain pathology similar to the pathology of Damasio's subjects, and 
he did have experimental results on somatic marking tests that were similar to 
the results of the experimental subjects. Assuming the validity of Damasio 's 
theory- a large assumption-this suggests that Cystkopf's capacity for rational-
ity was impaired, at least on one plausible account of the content of rationality. 
On the other hand, Damasio's subjects seemed to have somewhat different brain 
pathology and exhibited marked personality changes after suffering brain dam-
age, including dysfunctional social behavior and sociopathy.44 Cystkopf, who 
showed no such changes, was apparently different from Damasio's subjects, 
despite his similar scores on the marking procedure. Again, although the 
sub-arachnoid cyst had been present for decades and probably for his entire life, 
it is possible that the most severe effects of the brain damage occmTed only at 
the time of the crime. Two other, more parsimonious inferences are perhaps 
more likely, however. Cystkopf may have learned techniques or possessed other 
capacities to compensate for his somatic marking defect. Or, hi s brain damage 
may have been different from Damasio's subjects, and marking defects may be 
a substantial problem only if they occur in people with brain damage like 
Damasio's subjects. Cystkopf's excusing claim is strengthened if the cyst did 
impair his somatic marking and capacity for rationality at the time of the crime. 
In the alternative, if Cystkopf was relevantly diffe rent from Damasio's subjects 
or if he was able to compensate for his alleged marking defect, his excusmg 
claim is weakened. 
Until we have more evidence about Cystkopf, we can go no further. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
An analysis of moral and legal responsibility must begin with a normative 
theory of and criteria for excusing conditions. Assessment of responsibility in 
individual cases requires patient, cautiou s attention to all the evidence logically 
44. Damasio e t al., Individuals. supra note 18, at 8 1-82, 85. Damas io' s use of the diagnostic term 
"sociopathy'· is odd, beca use the American Psychiat ric Assoc iation does not employ thi s te rm in its 
official diagn ostic manual. It does inc lude "Anti soc ial Pe rsonality Disorder," to which Damasio 
appears to be referring. See DSM-IY. supra note 23. at 645-50. Damasio docs not indicate whether any 
o f hi s ex perimental subj ec ts met the full diagnostic c rit e ria for thi s d isorder, and he does no t provide 
sufficient data to permit readers to make an independent judgment. 
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and empirically relevant to the presence of genuine excusing conditions. Only if 
one understands the theory and criteria for excuse, however, can one fully 
appreciate what evidence is relevant and why. 
The case of Spyder Cystkopf is a perfectly generalizable example of the 
thesis. Causes of behavior are not excuses per se. Even confirmed causal 
physical pathology does not excuse human action unless it produces an indepen-
dent excusing condition. The focus, then, must be on whether at the time of the 
crime an individual lacked the capacity for rationality. In Cystkopf's case, his 
sub-arachnoid cyst and perhaps related neuropsychological defects were rel-
evant to assessing his capacity, but they were only a part of the puzzle. And they 
were relevant not just because they may have played a causal role, but because 
they may have affected his capacity for rationality. 
